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Tuesday, October 30, 2018

TESTIMONY ON BILLS 283 & 284


Robert Klitzkie, Esq.
22 Baki Ct., Yigo, GU 96929
 (671) 653-6607
29 October 2018

Honorable Chairman Frank Blas Aguon, Jr. and members of the Committee on Guam-U.S. Military Buildup, Infrastructure, and Transportation I appear before this honorable committee to lend my wholehearted support to Bills 283&284 and to offer the suggestion that provisions of Bill 304 be incorporated into Bill 284.

The label of the paper attached hereto reads in pertinent part: “I appear before you today to testify in favor of Bills 283&284 & 304-34.” “Today” was July 13. Because Sen. Tom Ada summarily cancelled the hearing set for 4 PM on that day in favor of a session that never happened and didn’t reschedule that hearing, this testimony was quite effectively squelched until today. As I read that testimony today I ask that you remember the temporal disconnect caused by Ada’s failure to schedule a hearing.

While I will read my July 13 testimony into the record today, two sentences from that testimony must be excised and set forth herein.

First: “Only the most naïve among us would proceed on the basis that the same people who created, abated, benefited from or ignored the scandal can be trusted to bring it to an end.”

Here, with respect to naïveté the immortal words of Walt Kelly’s Pogo are appropriate, “We have met the enemy and he is us.” Naïveté in this august body abounds to the effect that that same Tom Ada would introduce Bill 356 suggesting that seven others are naïve enough to pass this rather transparent attempt to sweep the entire CLTC scandal under the rug—or is it naïveté that Ada is looking for?

Second: “This crucial remedial legislation should have been passed in May. On April 19 Mt. Barrigada residents reported drainage concerns caused by a newly bulldozed road leading from Rte.16 into the boonies. The road led not only into the boonies but ran smack dab into a Pandora’s Box of untrustworthiness, incompetence, legal, ethical and moral problems, involving inter alia, DLM Director and Deputy Director respectively, Michael Borja and David  Camacho, Chamorro Land Trust Commission (CLTC) Chair, Pika Fejeran, Senator Régine Lee, employees of the CLTC, one of whom confessed on camera to a violation of 4 GCA §15204,…”

Rather than move these bills forward Ada allowed the situation to molder to the general disgust of all except the CLTC which recently announced that its investigation of itself and its staff showed no wrong doing.

I respectfully request the swift passage of these two salutary bills.


Robert Klitzkie



SETTING THE PDN STRAIGHT ON VOTING AND THE INSULAR CASES.


VOICE OF THE PEOPLE PDN Oct. 28
Editorial wrong on Insular Cases, vote
Your Turn
Robert Klitzkie Guest columnist
In response to a Pacific Daily News editorial from Oct. 12, the punch line from a TV comedy show is a rather shallow foundation upon which to build an editorial dealing with a serious subject. This glaringly false statement was uttered by Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori on the TV show “Last Week Tonight with John Oliver”: “The United States flag is flying over these lands so some people said, well, doesn’t that mean that American laws apply? In 1901 the Insular Cases, basically the judgment of the Supreme Court, the new territories were inhabited by alien quote alien races and they may not be able to understand Anglo-Saxon laws therefore the constitution doesn’t have to apply.”
Hattori, a Guam historian, condensed 147 pages of United States Supreme Court opinion into 38 words and presented that as the ratio decidendi, reason or rationale, and not the hypothetical obiter dictum, opinion, that it really was.
The three concurring opinions from which the court’s ruling was derived employed different rationales which yielded the holding in Downes, none of which relied on Guam historian Hattori’s 38 words to reach a result. Hattori’s statement smacks of a degree of sophistry that is perhaps fitting for a TV comic but not coming from a university professor who we should be able to take seriously.
In the other key case S. B. Downes and Co. was an importer who sued the collector of customs for New York to recover $659.35 paid in duty for the import of some bananas to George R. Bidwell the customs collector for New York. Downes turned on the determination of whether the Foraker Act (Puerto Rico’s Organic Act) passed constitutional muster. The Downes decision held only that the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution: “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;” was not applicable outside the 47 states that made up the union at that time. Here’s the holding in that case: “We are therefore of the opinion that the Island of Porto Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution; that the Foraker Act is constitutional, so far as it imposes duties upon imports from such island, and that the plaintiff cannot recover back the duties exacted in this case.”
The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore affirmed.
Downes dealt with customs duties not voting and not with the inapplicability of the constitution in Puerto Rico, et al., due to the presence of “alien races” therein. The “alien races” wordage is obiter dictum, doesn’t apply to Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Philippines or Guam and is stated only hypothetically.
Inability of residents of the territories does not stem from the Insular Cases but from the design of the American Republic where civil rights have a national dimension but political rights are arise from residence in one of the 50 states. Voting rights in national elections is not unavailable because of the Insular Cases.
The Pacific Daily News’ statement, “given the clearly racist language and logic, it’s disturbing that voting rights continue to be denied based on the Insular Cases,” is not only dead wrong but is very similar to arguments that attempt to gaslight Guam’s position in the American system in order to enhance argument for a Guam that is independent of the United States.
Numerous myths sounding in identity politics e.g.: We are second-class citizens; we are statutory, not constitutional, citizens; because of the Insular Cases we can’t vote for president; there are only three options for decolonization of the island; and that GovGuam is working toward decolonization and the one you just published, “Given the clearly racist language and logic, it’s disturbing that voting rights continue to be denied based on the Insular Cases” circulate.
This is a crucial time in the political development of Guam. Given that we live in a time when serious discussions concerning nationalism, statehood, self-determination, patriotism, national defense, self-government, racism, decolonization, home rule, hegemony, etc., require serious discussion, none of us is well-served by mythic distractions grounded in identity politics. I have higher hopes for the Pacific Daily News.

Wednesday, August 29, 2018

SUNSHINE LAW STONEWALL AT GEC

Sunshine Law stonewall
 
Yesterday, 12:24 PM
Sent Items
You forwarded this message on 8/30/2018 2:34 PM
Attachments

Sunday, August 12, 2018

"ALIEN RACES"




Robert,

Me: “However I'm not amused by "Guam Historian" Anne Perez Hattori's analysis linking our inability to vote in presidential elections to the Insular Cases.”

You:  “Hattori was talking about the origins of the unincorporated territorial status[1] and it was Olver [sic] who made the link to voting for President.”
______________________________________________________________________

This glaringly  FALSE STATEMENT was uttered by Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori on the TV show called  Last Week Tonight with John Oliver :

“The United States flag is flying over these lands so some people said well doesn’t that mean that American laws apply[2]? In 1901 the insular cases, basically the judgment of the Supreme Court, the new territories were inhabited by alien quote alien races and they may not be able to understand Anglo-Saxon laws therefore the constitution doesn’t have to apply.”

Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori condensed 147 pages of United States Supreme Court opinion into 38 words and presented that 38 word quote as the ratio decidendi and not the hypothetical obiter dictum that it really was. The three concurring opinions from which the Court’s ruling was derived employed different rationales which yielded the holding in Downes, none of which relied on Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori’s 38 words to reach a result.  Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori’s statement smacks of a degree of sophistry that is perhaps fitting for a TV comic but not coming from a university professor who we should be able to take seriously[3]. 

Nine United States Supreme Court cases were decided in 1901 which are generally identified as Insular Cases.[4] Probably the best way to gain an understanding of the Insular Cases and their import is to read the cases. Two key cases are of great import, each of which list one George R. Bidwell as the appellee. Bidwell the US customs collector for New York was sued in his official capacity to recover duty paid under protest on sugar “imported” from Port Rico[5]. The Supreme Court held that Puerto Rico was not a foreign country and therefore the collection of the tariff from De Lima was wrong. (De Lima v. Bidwell)

In the other key case S. B. Downes and Co. was an importer who sued the collector of customs for New York to recover $659.35 paid in duty for the import of some bananas to George R. Bidwell the customs collector for New York. Downes turned on an the determination of whether the Foraker Act passed constitutional muster.  The Downes decision held only that the Uniformity Clause, Art I § 8 ¶ 1 of the Constitution:

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;


was not applicable outside the 47 states[6] that made up the union at that time.

Here’s the holding in that case:
“We are therefore of opinion that the Island of Porto Rico is a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution; that the Foraker Act[7] is constitutional, so far as it imposes duties upon imports from such island, and that the plaintiff cannot recover back the duties exacted in this case.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore
Affirmed.
And the syllabus of the decision penned by Justice Brown:
Syllabus
By MR. JUSTICE BROWN, in announcing the conclusion and judgment of the Court.
The circuit courts have jurisdiction, regardless of amount, of actions against a collector of customs for duties exacted and paid under protest upon merchandise alleged not to have been imported.
The Island of Porto Rico is not a part of the United States within that provision of the Constitution which declares that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
Page 182 U. S. 245
There is a clear distinction between such prohibitions of the Constitution as go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place, and such as are operative only throughout the United States, or among the several states.
A long continued and uniform interpretation, put by the executive and legislative departments of the government upon a clause in the Constitution should be followed by the judicial department unless such interpretation be manifestly contrary to its letter or spirit.
Downes consists of 147 pages of analysis that spans the discipline of constitutional interpretation from the parsing of text, stare decisis and policy analysis, to historical and philosophical determinations.  Downes deals with tariff duties on oranges. Commercial interests, especially the sugar industry,  were the animas underlying Downes, not as Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori  would instruct, that Porto Rico was “…inhabited by alien quote alien races and they may not be able to understand Anglo-Saxon laws therefore the constitution doesn’t have to apply.”

Nine of the Insular Cases were decided in 1901. Eight dealt with Puerto Rico, one the Philippines (24 Diamond Rings.) None dealt with Guam nor did they have any applicability to Guam whatsoever.[8] At the time those insular cases were decided Guam wasn’t even a colony.[9] Guam was a prize of war governed by the President as commander in chief until such time that the Congress determined the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants.[10]

Four justices dissented and in so doing clearly defined the issue before the Court:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BREWER, and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, dissenting:
This is an action brought to recover moneys exacted by the collector of customs at the port of New York as import duties on two shipments of fruit from ports in the Island of Porto Rico to the port of New York in November, 1900.
The treaty ceding Porto Rico to the United States was ratified by the Senate February 6, 1899; Congress passed an act to carry out its obligations March 3, 1899, and the ratifications were exchanged, and the treaty proclaimed April 11, 1899. Then followed the act approved April 12, 1900. 31 Stat. 77, c. 191.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BREWER, MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, and myself are unable to concur in the opinions and judgment of the Court in this case. The majority widely differ in the reasoning by which the conclusion is reached, although there seems to be concurrence in the view that Porto Rico belongs to the United States, but nevertheless, and notwithstanding the act of Congress, is not a part of the United States subject to the provisions of the Constitution in respect of the levy of taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.
Page 182 U. S. 348
The inquiry is whether the Act of April 12, 1900, so far as it requires the payment of import duties on merchandise brought from a port of Porto Rico as a condition of entry into other ports of the United States, is consistent with the federal Constitution.
The act creates a civil government for Porto Rico, with a governor, secretary, attorney general, and other officers, appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,…
***
The first clause of sec. 8 of Article I of the Constitution
Page 182 U. S. 352
provides:
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."
Clauses four, five, and six of section nine are:
"No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken."
"No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."
This act on its face does not comply with the rule of uniformity, and that fact is admitted.
***
Glance at

If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought, the administration of government and justice according to Anglo-Saxon principles may for a time be impossible, and the question at once arises whether large concessions ought not to be made for a time, that ultimately our own theories may be carried out and the blessings of a free government under the Constitution extended to them. We decline to hold that there is anything in the Constitution to forbid such action.

NB the conditional nature of the first sentence established by the lead word in the quote: “if.” In other words the sentence speaks to what could happen, not past events. Surrounding paragraphs make this determination inevitable.

If Congress had power to acquire new territory, which is conceded, that power was not hampered by the constitutional provisions. If, upon the other hand, we assume
Page 182 U. S. 286
“…that the territorial clause of the Constitution was not intended to be restricted to such territory as the United States then possessed, there is nothing in the Constitution to indicate that the power of Congress in dealing with them was intended to be restricted by any of the other provisions.
***
In short, there is absolute silence upon the subject. The executive and legislative departments of the government have for more than a century interpreted this silence as precluding the idea that the Constitution attached to these territories as soon as acquired, and unless such interpretation be manifestly contrary to the letter or spirit of the Constitution, it should be followed by the judicial department.[11] Cooley, Const.Lim. secs. 81-85. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 111 U. S. 57; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 143 U. S. 691.
Its conditional nature is emphasized by the first sentence of the quote:
Patriotic and intelligent men may differ widely as to the desireableness [sic] of this or that acquisition, but this is solely a political question.
If Guam historian Anne Perez Hattori had noticed the hypothetical stated at pp. 286 et seq.:
“…the judgment of the Supreme Court, the new territories was inhabited by alien, quote alien, races and they may not be able to understand Anglo-Saxon laws therefore the constitution doesn’t have to apply.”

and had she read the triple rationales decidendi employed by the Supreme Court she might not have been so willing to be used by John Oliver as his “straight man.” [12]
There is much to learn from the Insular Cases about what an apparently prescient Chief Justice John Marshall referred to as an “American Empire.” University professors could have a role in the learning process:

 “…The general public should feel free to demand more from academics in terms of quality of thought, transparency of processes and, most of all, honesty and integrity. The public should feel free to respond with ideas and hold them accountable, especially if they use the title professor….”[13]


Best regards,

Bob



[1] As pointed out infra, Downes had three rationales decidendi. A better place to look for “unincorporated” is Balzac v. Porto Rico.
[2] Of course American laws do apply in Guam, cf. the CNMI re labor and immigration laws.
[3] “Anyone who uses the title professor has a special responsibility to be truthful. The general public should feel free to demand more from academics in terms of quality of thought, transparency of processes and, most of all, honesty and integrity.
At UOG, we have many academics who willingly share their ideas in public. The public should feel free to respond with ideas and hold them accountable, especially if they use the title professor. Academic freedom isn’t free, there are many responsibilities associated with it.” Words that are familiar to you, Robert.
[4] Armstrong v. United States
Crossman v. United States
De Lima v. Bidwell
Dooley v. United States 182 U.S. 222 (1901)
Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901)
Downes v. Bidwell
Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States
Goetze v. United States
Huus v. New York and Porto Rico Steamship Co.
[5] After the Treaty of Paris the US changed the name of the island to Porto Rico, probably in deference to English speaking Americans. The name was changed back ot Puerto Rico in 1932.
[6] Oklahoma, New Mexico and Arizona (and of course Alaska and Hawaii) had not yet been admitted.
[7] The Foraker Act, enacted 1900, was the first Organic Act for Puerto Rico. It established civil government, a US District Court and a non voting Resident Commissioner to Congress. § 3 of the Foraker Act provided for an internal tariff which would arguably violate the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution. Thus the procedural challenge in Downes v. Bidwell.

‘Sec. 3. That on and after the passage of this Act all merchandise coming into the United States from Porto Rico and coming into Porto Rico from the United States shall be entered at the several ports of entry upon payment of fifteen per centum of the duties which are required to be levied, collected, and paid upon like articles of merchandise imported from foreign countries;…”

[8] Guam is not an unincorporated territory because of the Insular Cases. Guam is an unincorporated territory because the Congress said it is: “Unincorporated Territory -- Government. Guam is hereby declared to be an unincorporated territory of the United States and the capital and seat of government thereof shall be located at the city of Agaña, Guam.” 48 USC § 1421a. (NB the effect of deleting the first syllable of the first word!)
[9] Guam became a colony of the United States upon enactment of the Organic Act, 48 USC § 1421 et seq. Before the Organic Act, the President of the United States as commander-in-chief ruled Guam awaiting the determination of Congress. (See fn 10.)

[10]Treaty of Paris: Article IX. “Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory…

***
“The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.”
[11]  Undoubtedly a reference to, the development of what Chief Justice Marshall called “the American empire.”
[12] She might have even accurately quoted the opinion!
[13] Ibid. 3


Monday, August 6, 2018

NOTICE OF OPEN GOVERNMENT LAW VIOLATION AND SUNSHINE LAW DEMAND



Robert Klitzkie, Esq.
22 Baki Ct., Yigo, GU 96929
 (671) 653-6607
August 5, 2018

Re: Notice of Open Government Law violation and Sunshine Law demand

To: Superintendent Fernandez as Executive Secretary of the Guam Education Board(GEB) for the GEB

Because the GEB violated the Open Government Law the action that it took in the special meeting you called for July 10 is a nullity.

You published notice of the July 10 special meeting of the Guam Education Board on July 2. The notice contained no reference to my June 24 complaint. 5 GCA § 8108 requires that notices of special meetings contain the essential matters concerning the meeting. That section reads in pertinent part:

“§ 8108. Special Meeting. A special meeting may be called at any time by a public agency, by delivering personally, or by mail, written notice to each member of a public agency. Notice shall also be given to each newspaper of general circulation and broadcasting station which airs a regular local news program within Guam. Such notice must be delivered personally or by mail at least five (5) working days, and a second public notice at least forty-eight (48) hours, before the time of such meeting as specified in the notice. The call and notice shall specify the time and place of the special meeting and the business to be transacted. No other business shall be considered at such meetings by the public agency. …” [NB the use of the words “business to be transacted.”]

The GEB’s failure to comply with the Open Government Law makes its “decision” of July 10 a nullity per 5 GCA § 8114:

“§ 8114. Action Voided. Any action taken at a meeting in violation of any Section of this Chapter shall be void and of no effect, provided that this nullification of actions taken at such meetings shall not apply to any commitment, otherwise legal, affecting the public debt of the entity concerned.”

Even reference the use of the words “personnel matters” in the July 2 notice doesn’t serve to legitimize the action taken at the July 10 meeting even if the GEB recognizes you as having the ability to see into the future! The GEB decision, the videos and the minutes sent in response to my Sunshine Law request make it abundantly clear that the Election Commission decision was the only thing considered in the executive session at the July 10 GEB special meeting. The GEB couldn’t have known on July 2 that it would have the July 10 Election Commission decision in its hands on July 10. Ironically there isn’t even anything in the record of the GEB that the Election Commission decision was ever received by the GEB.

The record shows that an unnamed “legal counsel” was invited into the executive session. An assumption that “legal counsel” is an attorney who can advise the GEB triggers the necessity to comply with 5 GCA § 8111(c) (1) et seq. the salient provisions of which are set out below with my highlights:

(c) Under no circumstances shall a public agency hold an executive or closed meeting to discuss legal matters, impending legal matters or legal strategies with an attorney, except as herein provided below. All such discussions must be held in a public meeting and minutes shall be kept and opened to the public, except as herein provided:
(1) No such meeting may be closed except on the written recommendation of the attorney, and an affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the Board of the Public Agency to go into executive session.

5 GCA § 8111(c) (2) through (7) set out the requirements for an executive session attended by counsel. The GEB did not comply with any of these provisions.

A review of the proceedings shows that somehow the Election Commission decision magically appeared in the improperly called executive session at a meeting held in violation of the Open Government Law. Any action taken re the petition of June 24 is void.

The opportunity for a “do over” is actually beneficial for two reasons:
·       The Election Commission decided only one of the two issues brought before it  by the petition.
·       I submit that the issue that was decided was so poorly done that for the GEB to adopt it as its ratio decidendi is egregious error.
The Election Commission decided only the 3 GCA § 8202 claim which can be described as the “ultimatum claim.” The commission completely ignored the 3 GCA § 8206 claim which can be described as the “payment to promote election claim.” Submitted herewith and incorporated by reference is my Demand to Reopen Proceedings sent to the Election Commission on July 31.  That demand parses and reiterates items from the July 24 petition. Set out below is ¶ 12. from the June 24 petition as quoted in the Demand plus a quote from the Rodriguez+Cruz press release. This quote is clearly lays out the payment to promote election claim.

12.The same conduct described in ¶4 of the Rodriguez+Cruz release [incorporated below for easy reference] suggests a violation of 4 GCA § 8206, which reads: “§ 8206. Payment to Promote Election. Any person who, with the intent to promote the election of himself or herself or any other person, furnishes or engages to pay or deliver any money or property for any purposes intended to promote the election of any nominee or candidate, except as to the expenses of holding and conducting public meetings for the discussion of questions, and of printing and circulating handbills and other papers prior to an election, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Jon Fernandez violated § 8206.”

¶4 of the Rodriguez+Cruz release is set out below:

DOE and the AG knew from the start that Dave was changing his employment status so that he could legally remain a teacher while running for public office,” Dennis said. “Even the Governor’s Office was aware of this back in February, which is why Jadeen Tuncap put the contract over our heads as ransom for my support of the governor’s tax bill. We took the steps to see to it that everything was legit, and we didn't hide anything from anyone. So for these same entities to come back and tell Dave something different, it tells you that this ultimatum is being given for nothing else but political considerations.”

Simply put Rodriguez+Cruz allege that Superintendent Fernandez colluded with David Cruz re his contract so he could stay on the payroll and run for Lt. Governor. Other paragraphs in the Demand and Petition flesh out this argument that alleges violation of § 8206. This claim should be decided by the GEB and not shrugged off sub silencio in the manner of the Election Commission.

The GEB is also in position to make its own decision on the “ultimatum claim” rather than erroneously adopting the decision of Election Commission. An example from that decision demonstrates the maladroitness of Election Commission’s handling of that matter. Here’s the description from the Demand:

“Cruz lays out an unmistakable case of “ultimatum.”  So when Cruz was sworn in and his testimony taken on the matter what was his response? Dumb question isn’t it, as the Commission didn’t take any testimony. The Commission completely stonewalled Cruz. The so-called “facts” as set forth on page two of your letter refer to documents submitted by Fernandez seven times. The only time Cruz appears in the “Facts” is the hearsay statement at ¶ 6. Cruz is not referenced anywhere else in the “Facts.”

In the absence of Cruz’ explanation of the use of “ultimatum” there is no legitimacy in the Commission’s decision. Your letter uses “weasel words” to describe what can only be described as an “ultimatum,” to wit:
·       “…that Mr. Fernandez gave Mr. Cruz an opportunity to comply with the law.
·       “...Mr. Fernandez’ indication that he may have to terminate Mr. Cruz’ contract if he did not comply with Guam law.”
Fernandez clearly had the ability to fire Cruz for misconduct. If he had, end of story. If Fernandez decided not to fire Cruz, end of story (at least that story.) But when Fernandez “gave Mr. Cruz the opportunity to comply with the law” or he would “have to terminate Mr. Cruz’ contract”—ULTIMATUM. “Ultimatum” was brought before the Commission by the Rodriguez+Cruz press release.”

The GEB now has the opportunity to decide both the §§ 8202 and 8206 claims on its own as befits its role as an agency independent of the Election Commission and not slavishly follow the inept half decision of the Commission. Quaere: if the Election Commission had decided against Superintendent Fernandez would the GEB have been so quick to adopt its decision? 

It is respectfully requested that GEB take notice of the papers I have submitted and make its own decision on the §§ 8202 and 8206 claims. It is also requested that Superintendent Fernandez, pursuant to the Sunshine Law, email the following documents to me NLT COB August 9:
  1. Documents received from the Election Commission re its decision comcerning Superintendent Fernandez,
  2. Documents transmitting the decision to members of the GEB.
  3. Emails sent or received by any member of the GEB related to the decision.
  4. Any other correspondence in possession of any officer of employee of the Department of Education related to the decision.

/s/ Robert Klitzkie
Robert Klitzkie